Fitzpatrick, Simon (2020) Avoiding anthropocentrism in evolutionarily inclusive
ethics. Animal Sentience 29(29)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1611

Date of submission: 2020-07-02
Date of acceptance: 2020-07-17

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2020.358: Fitzpatrick on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds

Avoiding anthropocentrism in evolutionarily inclusive ethics
Commentary on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds

Simon Fitzpatrick
Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University
Abstract: Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma”
that invertebrates are unworthy of ethical concern. However, developing an evolutionarily
inclusive ethics requires facing some of the more radical implications of rejecting hierarchical
scala naturae and human-centered conceptions of the biological world. In particular, we need to
question the anthropocentric assumptions that still linger in discussions like these.
Simon Fitzpatrick, Associate
Professor of Philosophy, John
Carroll University, works on
theoretical and methodological
issues in the study of nonhuman
animal cognition and the
cognitive science of morality.
Website

Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) make a good case for calling into question the “invertebrate
dogma” of ignoring invertebrates (especially arthropods) as potential subjects of ethical concern.
M&P’s case is built on evidence of convergent evolution for cognitive capacities, including
sentience. in vertebrates and a diverse variety of invertebrates. This evidence suggests that to be
consistent with the treatment of vertebrates many invertebrates are candidates for welfare
consideration. However, like Monsó & Osuna-Mascaró (2020), I have some concerns about this
consistency approach. Like Figdor (2020 and forthcoming), I think an evolutionarily inclusive
ethics requires facing some of the more radical implications of rejecting hierarchical, scala
naturae and human-centered views of the biological world. In particular, we need to question
lingering anthropocentric assumptions.
In animal ethics we are frequently concerned with questions about how we as human
beings should behave toward other species and what our ethical obligations toward them may
or may not be. This makes sense because we can only make ethical decisions for ourselves.
However, a form of ethical anthropocentrism is still there when we frame these questions in
terms of our granting moral status to them, as if we have some special authority or ownership
over moral status—either that we are the ones who get to grant it, or, more often, that we are
the measure of it. Despite commitment to secularism and Darwinism, this way of thinking is
implicit in much of the animal ethics literature, and M&P seem to adopt it, too, by pursuing the
standard strategy of pointing to apparent cognitive and other similarities between various
invertebrates and adult human beings. This is fine, as far as it goes, for getting reluctant human
beings -- with their anachronistic assumptions about invertebrates and cognitive-affective biases
M&P describe -- to even consider invertebrates as potential subjects of ethical concern. But
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Monsó & Osuna-Mascaró point out the numerous problems with extending standard “wideningthe-circle” approaches in animal ethics to the radically un-human-like ways of life of many
invertebrate species. If ants or termites matter ethically, that can’t be because we can fit them
neatly into individualistic welfare-centered ethical theories modelled on human beings.
As Figdor (2018, 2020, forthcoming) argues, abandoning a human-centered scala naturae
also entails abandoning the assumption that similarity to human beings should be the standard
for judging other species -- both their cognitive capacities and their moral status. This is easy to
see using Woodhall’s (2015) analogy between anthropocentrism (Kopnina et al. 2018) and
androcentrism. The strategy of beginning with human beings, identifying traits that confer moral
status on us, and then expanding this outward to other species that share the relevant traits is
analogous to taking (white) cisgendered males as the normative standard and expanding
outward to other human beings in terms of how they measure up to that standard.
A non-human-centered, evolutionarily inclusive ethics needs to reject the notion that
human beings are the measure of all things. We need to question common intuitions about what
matters ethically and to be more humble about our understanding of the nature and scope of
ethical value: What we as human beings typically take to be of ethical concern need not exhaust
all that is of ethical concern; what we typically care about need not be all that should be cared
about.
This has implications for the notion of moral status. Our parochial intuitions about what
might distort our view about which organisms are worthy of ethical concern just as much as the
cognitive-affective biases M&P describe. I hence agree with Levy (2020) that we should not take
it for granted that sentience is necessary for moral status. The same applies, however, to Levy’s
proposal that it is cognition, not sentience, that is necessary. Neither may be necessary. This is
not to say that sentience and cognition don’t matter, or that there aren’t good arguments for
emphasizing sentience as a basis for moral status; it is just that we need to reflect more on why
we should take sentience (or whatever it is) as the measure for moral status and be sure we are
not simply assuming that our own species is the moral yardstick.
Similar issues arise about the practical implications of including invertebrates in our
ethical deliberations. Browning & Veit (2020) are quite right that acknowledging the moral status
of invertebrates needn’t necessarily entail radical changes to human behavior. However, we must
be careful not to settle for rationalizations based on human-centered conceptions of what is “too
demanding”. Ethical revolutions may appear “too demanding” for those whose practices come
into question; so we do have to take it seriously that understanding our moral obligations to
invertebrates may have quite radical implications for human practices. Some (e.g., Carruthers,
2007) take anything that would entail radical changes in human behavior as evidence that
conclusions like those of M&P are absurd. This shows how blatant human anthropocentrism can
be; but we need to be careful to avoid the more subtle forms of anthropocentrism, too.
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